5. Sharing of Threat Intelligence

Supported ITAPS recommendations

(Regular print are supported ITAPS recommendations in response to questions, flagged are expanded recommendations to more explicitly address questions, not directly addressed by ITAPS; participated in and collaborated with ITAPS OMB-OPM-NSC Task Force) How can agencies and industry implement and sustain threat data sharing and create a robust, timely and systemic sharing environment (more than just incidents) that can... more »

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5. Sharing of Threat Intelligence

"Skin in the Game”

A multifaceted approach of building trust, having “skin in the game” (“AntiFragile” - Taleb), incentives and penalties for both industry and government. It has to be made in the best interest of both “parties” to share threat intelligence. This coupled with a multifaceted approach of incentives, disincentives, non attribution, etc. Then you increase the probability that sharing will occur. The incentives for government... more »

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8. Building Effective Security into Acquisitions

IT Hardware Country of Origin Limits

With the preponderance of IT devices and chipsets being manufactured in China, there is a distinct possibility that the PLA is hard-coding spyware and back-doors in the hardware built there. Acquisition laws need to specifically require that all components & sub-components used in sensitive IT / data communications systems be built / fabricated and assembled by U.S. companies in the US. Further, safeguards (inspections... more »

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